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Summary
Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network have conducted a
sophisticated public relations and media campaign over the last ten years. Terrorism
analysts believe that these messages have been designed to elicit psychological
reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global audience as well
as to specific populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia.
Some officials and analysts believe that Al Qaeda’s messages contain signals that
inform and instruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks.  Bin Laden
has referred to his public statements as important primary sources for parties seeking
to understand Al Qaeda’s ideology and political demands.  Global counterterrorism
operations in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks appear to have
limited Bin Laden’s ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda
operatives and affiliated groups.  However he and other Al Qaeda leaders continue
to release statements that sanction, encourage, and provide guidance for future
terrorist operations.  Iraq, in particular, has become a focal point for Al Qaeda’s
rhetoric, as recent statements have underscored Al Qaeda’s interest in Iraq and
support for the ongoing insurgency.
The release of new statements by Osama Bin Laden and his Deputy Ayman Al
Zawahiri in late 2004 rekindled public debate surrounding Al Qaeda’s ideology,
motives, and future plans to attack the United States.  The ideological content and
highly political tone of the recent statements have led some terrorism analysts to
speculate that the messages may signal a new attempt by Bin Laden and his
associates to create a lasting leadership role for themselves and the Al Qaeda
organization as the vanguard of an emerging, more loosely organized international
jihadist movement. Others have argued that the presently limited operational
capabilities of Al Qaeda’s central leaders have inspired a revival of ideological
outreach efforts and that the group’s primary goal remains carrying out terrorist
attacks against the United States and its allies around the world, with particular
emphasis on targeting economic infrastructure and fomenting unrest in Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and Afghanistan.  
This report reviews Al Qaeda’s use of public statements from the mid-1990s to
the present and analyzes the evolving ideological and political content of those
statements.  The report focuses primarily on statements made by Osama Bin Laden,
but also considers statements made by his chief deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri, who
some experts consider to be Al Qaeda’s chief ideologue, and recent remarks by Abu
Musab Al Zarqawi, who has been recognized by Osama Bin Laden as an Al Qaeda
ally and the leader of “mujahideen” operations in Iraq.  The report will be updated
periodically.  For background on the Al Qaeda terrorist network, see CRS Report
RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict.
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1  Unless indicated, all translated citations are derived from “Compilation of Usama Bin
Ladin Statements 1994 - January 2004,” FBIS Report - GMP20040209000243, Feb. 9, 2004.
2  Recent Al Qaeda messages have been produced by a dedicated studio, known as the Al
Sahab.Institute for Media Productions.
3  For example, in Bin Laden’s October 2004 pre-election message he referred to specific
pre-9/11 interviews with a variety of media outlets as previous indications of Al Qaeda’s
ideology and demands.
Al Qaeda: Statements
 and Evolving Ideology
Introduction
Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network have conducted a
sophisticated public relations and media campaign over the last ten years using a
series of faxed statements, audio recordings, video appearances, and Internet
postings.1 Terrorism analysts believe that these messages have been designed to elicit
psychological reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global
audience as well as to specific populations in the Islamic world, the United States,
Europe, and Asia.  Bin Laden and his deputies have personally stated their belief in
the importance of harnessing the power of international and regional media for Al
Qaeda’s benefit, and Al Qaeda’s central leadership structure has featured a dedicated
media and communications committee tasked with issuing reports and statements in
support of the group’s operations.2  Some officials and analysts believe that Al
Qaeda’s messages contain signals that inform and instruct operatives to prepare for
and carry out new attacks.
Bin Laden has referred to his public statements as important primary sources for
parties seeking to understand Al Qaeda’s ideology and political demands.3  Through
his public statements over the last ten years, Bin Laden has portrayed himself both
as the leader of a consistent ideological movement and a strategic commander willing
to tailor his violent messages and acts to respond to specific political circumstances
and to influence specific audiences and events.  Global counterterrorism operations
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks appear to have limited
Bin Laden’s ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda
operatives and affiliated groups.  However he and other Al Qaeda leaders continue
to release statements that sanction, encourage, and provide guidance for future
terrorist operations.
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4  For more on Bin Laden and defensive jihad, see James Turner Johnson, “Jihad and Just
War,” First Things, June/July 2002, pp. 12-14. Bin Laden has identified Salafist thinkers
such as his former mentor Abdallah Azzam, Hamas founder Ahmed Yasin, World Trade
Center bombing conspirator Omar Abdel Rahman, Saudi dissident clerics Salman Al Awdah
and Safar Al Hawali, and 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyah as prominent
ideological influences.  For more on Salafism see CRS Report RS21695, The Islamic
Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya.
5  Robert Fisk, “Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin” Independent (London), July 10,
1996.
6  “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Mosques,” Al Islah (London), Sept. 2, 1996.
7  At the time, Bin Laden expressed no solidarity or sympathy for Saddam Hussein or his
regime, explaining — “We, as Muslims, do not like the Iraqi regime but we think that the
Iraqi people and their children are our brothers and we care about their future.”  Fisk,
(continued...)
Al Qaeda: Statements 1994-2001
Founding Principles.  Osama Bin Laden’s experiences as a logistical
coordinator and financier for the Afghan and Arab resistance to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan during the 1980s are thought to have provided the backdrop for his
belief that Muslims could take effective military action inspired by select Islamic
principles.  His exposure to the teachings of conservative Islamist scholars in Saudi
Arabia and his work with Arab militants in Afghanistan provided the theological and
ideological basis for his belief in the desirability of puritanical Salafist Islamic reform
in Muslim societies and the necessity of armed resistance in the face of perceived
aggression — a concept Al Qaeda has since associated with a communally-binding
Islamic principle known as “defensive jihad.”4  After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1990, Bin Laden expressed these views in opposition to the introduction of foreign
military forces to Saudi Arabia.  Bin Laden characterized the presence of U.S. and
other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War as cause for
renewed commitment to defensive jihad and the promotion of violence against the
Saudi government and the United States. 
Declaration of Jihad.  In the early 1990s, Bin Laden emphasized his desire
to secure the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops from Saudi Arabia at all
costs.  Bin Laden criticized the Saudi royal family publicly and alleged that their
invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian peninsula constituted an affront to the
sanctity of the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the global Islamic community.5
Finding his rhetoric and efforts rebuffed by Saudi leaders, Bin Laden was expelled
from Saudi Arabia and his ire increasingly focused on the United States. Following
a period of exile in Sudan and Afghanistan in which his radical views sharpened, Bin
Laden issued a declaration of jihad against the United States in 1996 that signaled his
emergence as an internationally recognizable figure and offered a full account of his
main critiques of an enemy he described as the “alliance of Jews, Christians, and
their agents.”6 Adopting the sensitive historical and religious imagery of Islamic
resistance to the European Crusades, Bin Laden condemned the U.S. military
presence in Saudi Arabia, criticized the international sanctions regime on Iraq, and
voiced his opposition to U.S. support for Israel.7 The declaration also cited
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7 (...continued)
“Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin” Independent (London), July 10, 1996. op. cit.
8  “Declaration of Jihad,” Al Islah (London), Sept. 2, 1996. op. cit.
9  See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
Simon and Schuster, 1998. 
10 “Correspondent Meets With Opposition Leader Bin Ladin,” Channel 4 (London) Feb. 20,
1997.
11 “Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Ladin,” (Islamabad, Pakistan), Mar. 18, 1997.
12 “Website Publishes Bin Ladin ‘Speech’” Internet Supporters of Shariah, June 22, 2000;
and “Al Jazirah Program on Bin Laden” Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar),  June 10, 1999.
13  “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans,” Al Quds Al Arabi (London), Feb. 23,
1998.  The fatwa argued that defensive jihad was necessary “in order to liberate the al-Aqsa
Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip [the U.S. and Israel].”
“massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani [as
transliterated], Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina” as
examples of a growing war on Islam for which the United States should be punished
(Bin Laden did not recognize the humanitarian aspects of U.S. efforts in Bosnia and
Somalia explicitly).8
“Clash of Civilizations”.  Following his declaration of jihad on the United
States, Bin Laden released a series of statements that expanded the vision and scope
of his self-declared conflict with the United States and specified his political
prescriptions for the reformation of Islamic societies.  Echoing U.S. academic
Samuel Huntington’s theory on the impending clash of civilizations,9 Bin Laden
repeated his characterization of a so-called “new crusade led by America against the
Islamic nations,” and emphasized his belief that an emerging conflict between Islam
and the West would be fought “between the Islamic world and the Americans and
their allies.”10  Bin Laden argued that the Islamic world should see itself as one
seamless community, or umma, and that Muslims were obliged to unite and defend
themselves.  Turning his focus to the internal politics of the Islamic world, Bin Laden
urged Muslims to find a leader to unite them and establish a “pious caliphate” that
would be governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic principles of finance and social
conduct.11  Bin Laden repeatedly argued that Afghanistan had become a model
Islamic state under his Taliban hosts and used religious rhetoric to solicit support for
the Taliban and Al Qaeda.12
Although he possesses no traditional Islamic religious credentials or authority,
Bin Laden issued a fatwa, or religious edict, in 1998 that claimed that the United
States had made “a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims”13
through its policies in the Islamic world.  The fatwa made use of the principle of
defensive jihad to argue that U.S. aggression made armed resistance and the targeting
of American civilians and military personnel incumbent upon all Muslims. The
statement also announced the formation of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad
against the Jews and Crusaders,” which consisted of a tacit alliance between Bin
Laden, his supporters, and a number of regional Islamic militant groups.  Following
Al Qaeda’s bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the
CRS-4
14 Bin Laden specifically cited “Sabra, Shatila, Deir Yasin, Qana, Hebron and elsewhere.”
“Al Jazirah Program on Bin Laden” Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar),  June 10, 1999.
15 “It is a fundamental principle of any democracy that the people choose their leaders, and
as such, approve and are party to the actions of their elected leaders... By electing these
leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian
people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. This
is why the American people are not innocent. The American people are active members in
all these crimes.”  “Statement From Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, May God Protect Him, and
Al Qaeda Organization,” Al Qal’ah (Internet), Oct. 14, 2002.
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen(2000), Bin Laden refused to take direct responsibility for the
attacks, but claimed that he approved of the strikes and shared the motivations of the
individuals who had carried them out.  Bin Laden argued that the bombings should
be seen by Americans and the world as retribution for U.S. policy and compared
them to alleged “massacres” of Palestinians in historic cases familiar to many
Muslims and Arabs.14
Al Qaeda Post-9/11
Osama Bin Laden’s longstanding threats to strike the United States came to
fruition on September 11, 2001, and Bin Laden subsequently issued several
statements alluding to Al Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks on New York and
Washington. Following an established pattern, Bin Laden acknowledged his support
for the hijackers and repeated his claim that strikes on American targets should be
viewed by Muslims and Americans as a defensively motivated response to perceived
American aggression in the Islamic world. Statements attributed to Bin Laden
promised further attacks and sought to justify Al Qaeda’s targeting of American
civilians by arguing that American society was morally corrupt and that American
civilians should be held accountable for the policies of their democratically elected
government.15  
Reflecting on the subsequent U.S. response to the attacks, Bin Laden has
described the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as new “crusades” and highlighted
both the considerable economic impact of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent costs
of the U.S. military response as indications of Al Qaeda’s effectiveness. Both Bin
Laden and his deputy Ayman Al Zawahiri have criticized the population and
governments of the Islamic world for failing to answer their calls to arms and for
cooperating with the United States and its allies.  These criticisms have been coupled
with renewed calls for armed “resistance” against the United States and its allies.  
Bin Laden has addressed the governments and citizens of Europe and the United
States directly in an effort to discourage support for their current policies in the
Islamic world. In April 2004, Bin Laden offered Europeans a “truce” if they agreed
to abandon their support for the United States and their military commitments in Iraq
and Afghanistan.  The offer was resoundingly rejected by European leaders and their
citizens.  In October 2004, on the eve of the U.S. presidential election, Bin Laden
made a similar statement in which he urged Americans to reevaluate their policies
toward the Islamic world and threatened to bleed and bankrupt the United States.  In
CRS-5
16  “Bin Ladin Contests Legality of Saudi Rulers, Praises Attack on US Consulate,” FBIS
Report - GMP20041216000222, December 16, 2004.
17  “Website Posts Full Version of New Audiotape Attributed to Bin Ladin,” FBIS Report -
FEA20041227000762, December 27, 2004.  Bin Laden’s endorsement read, “It should be
known that Mujahid brother Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi is the Amir of the Tanzim al-Qa’idah
fi Bilad al-Rafidayn [Al-Qa’ida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers]. The brothers
in the group there should heed his orders and obey him in all that which is good.”
18  Bin Laden described the stakes of the confrontation between coalition and jihadist forces
in Iraq in the following terms: “The whole world is watching this war and the two
adversaries; the Islamic nation, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the
other. It is either victory and glory or misery and humiliation. The nation today has a very
rare opportunity to come out of the subservience and enslavement to the West and to smash
the chains with which the Crusaders have fettered it.” FBIS Report - FEA20041227000762,
December 27, 2004.
late November 2004, Al Zawahiri stated Al Qaeda’s intention to continue its jihad
against the United States indefinitely until its leaders deem “U.S. policy toward
Muslims” to be non-aggressive.  
Recent Statements on Saudi Arabia and Iraq
Two audio tapes released by Osama Bin Laden in December 2004 called for
continued attacks on U.S. forces and interests and provided further insight into Al
Qaeda’s ideology and political goals.  Each message was addressed to a specific
audience and revealed Bin Laden’s perspectives on unfolding events in Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.  The first tape, released on December 16,
2004, received media attention for its praise of an Al Qaeda-affiliated group’s attack
on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in early December 2004.16  The
remainder of the tape was devoted to delivering a litany of religiously based
criticisms of the Saudi royal family for its support for the United States and its
insufficient commitment to the implementation of Islamic law and moral principles.
In the tape, Bin Laden appealed directly to “the silent ulema” (religious scholars) and
business and community leaders in Saudi Arabia to withdraw their support for the
ruling Al Saud family. 
A second tape, released on December 27, 2004, underscored Al Qaeda’s interest
in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency.  In this recording, Bin Laden
personally welcomed and endorsed Jordanian-born terrorist leader Abu Musab Al
Zarqawi as an Al Qaeda affiliate and leader of Al Qaeda operations in Iraq.17  The
remainder of the tape described the importance of the conflict in Iraq to the jihadist
cause from Al Qaeda’s perspective.  Bin Laden identified the insurgency in Iraq as
“a golden and unique opportunity” for jihadists to engage and defeat the United
States, and he characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a “Third
World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation.”18
 Describing Baghdad as “the capital of the caliphate,” Bin Laden asserted that “jihad
in Palestine and Iraq today is a duty for the people of the two countries” and other
Muslims.  He also  employed well-known Quranic injunctions against failing to
CRS-6
19  Bin Laden: “The one who stays behind and fails to join the Mujahidin when Jihad
becomes an individual duty commits a cardinal sin... The most pressing duty after faith is
repelling the aggressor enemy. This means that the nation should devote its resources, sons,
and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its lands.”  FBIS Report -
FEA20041227000762, December 27, 2004.  See also the Quran - Al Tawbah, 9:42-72.
20  As Bin Laden describes it, “Islam is one unit that can not be divided.”  Islam is, “a way
of life revealed by God for men to abide by all of its aspects in all their affairs.” FBIS
Report - FEA2004122700076, December 27, 2004.
21  “Al-Zawahiri Denounces US, Argues for Reign of Islamic Law and Caliphate, Jihad
Against Crusaders and Jews,” FBIS Report - GMP20050131000021, January 31, 2005.
contribute to “the cause of God” to appealed to Muslims to support Al Qaeda and its
jihadist affiliates politically, financially, and militarily.19
Implications for Al Qaeda’s Evolving Ideology and Strategy
Al Qaeda and Political Islam.  Recent statements from Osama Bin Laden,
Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi display the uncompromising
commitment of Al Qaeda’s leaders and affiliates to a consistent ideological agenda
focused on the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from Islamic societies and
the creation of an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.  The political prescriptions
outlined in the statements are rooted in an Islamic principle known as tawhid, or the
principle of the absolute unity of God and an identification of Islam as an all-
encompassing religious, political, and social system.20  According to this perspective,
Islamic faith, adherence to Islamic law, and implementation of conservative Islamic
social and political principles are synonymous.  Throughout their recent statements,
Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi characterized as “infidels” those who do not share
these beliefs, those who oppose the creation of an Islamic state on the terms they
describe, and those supporting existing governments and coalition activities in the
Islamic world.
“The Three Foundations.”  In a January 30, 2005 audiotape, Ayman Al
Zawahiri identified the “three foundations” of Al Qaeda’s political ideology and
applied them to recent events.21  Zawahiri, who is regarded as Al Qaeda’s chief
ideologue, described Al Qaeda’s core principles in sharp contrast to secular and
religious reform ideologies voiced by other Muslims as well as recent U.S. support
for democracy.  This may signal an attempt by Al Qaeda’s leadership to renew and
clearly define its goals as a basis for attracting new recruits and inspiring new
affiliates.  The “three foundations,” as outlined by Al Zawahiri are as follows: 
! “The Quran-Based Authority to Govern.”  According to Al
Zawahiri, Al Qaeda supports the creation of an Islamic state
governed solely by sharia law.  Secular government or “man-made”
law is considered unacceptable and deemed contrary to Islamic faith.
! “The Liberation of the Homelands.”  Zawahiri argued that reforms
and free elections will not be possible for Muslims without first
establishing “the freedom of the Muslim lands and their liberation
from every aggressor.”  He also  emphasized the importance of
CRS-7
22  For example, Bin Laden has linked his opposition to insufficiently Islamic governance
in Saudi Arabia to his view that under the Saudi monarchy, “absolute obedience and
supremacy are given to the king and his laws, and not to God’s religion.”  FBIS Report -
GMP20041216000222, December 16, 2004.
23  “Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi’s Message on Democracy, Iraqi Elections, Shiites,” FBIS
Report - GMP20050123000140. According to Bin Laden, Muslims have a right to
participate in the selection of their rulers only under certain “conditions,” namely the
absence of occupying foreign powers and the presence of candidates willing to rule solely
according to Islamic law.  FBIS Report - FEA20041227000762, December 27, 2004.  
24  “Al-Zarqawi’s Group Issues Post-Election Statement, Claims Attacks Against US
Embassy, Mosul Targets,” FBIS Report - FEA20050201001026, February 1, 2005.
25  Bin Laden’s critiques of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the
Palestinian Authority reflect these sentiments: “The constitution (TAL), which was imposed
by U.S. occupier Bremer, is a man-made and pagan constitution, which insisted that Islam
(continued...)
establishing control over the Middle East’s energy resources and
described the Muslim world as “impotent and exposed to the Israeli
nuclear arsenal.” 
! “The Liberation of the Human Being.”  Zawahiri articulated a vision
of a contractual social relationship between Muslims and their rulers
that would permit people to choose and criticize their leaders but
also demand that Muslims resist and overthrow rulers who violate
Islamic laws and principles.  He criticized hereditary government
and identified a need “to specify the power of the sharia based
judiciary, and insure that no one can dispose of the people’s rights,
except in accordance with this judiciary.”
Al Qaeda, Democracy, and Reform.  Recent statements from Osama Bin
Laden and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi applied these and other similar principles to
current issues of democracy, reform, and conflict in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the
Palestinian territories. In both of his December 2004 statements, for example, Bin
Laden clearly stated his view that democracies, constitutional governments, and
insufficiently Islamic monarchies are equally unacceptable forms of governance for
Islamic societies because they empower human rulers and man-made legal systems
rather than “the law of God.”22  Abu Musab Al Zarqawi expanded on these
sentiments in a January 2004 statement which characterized democracy as a rival
“religion” to Islam and criticized adherence to democratic principles such as freedom
of speech and freedom of religion as un-Islamic and tantamount to apostasy
punishable by death.23  A statement released by Zarqawi’s group following Iraq’s
recent election stated that, “we shall not accept the rule of anyone but that of God and
His Prophet [Mohammed].”24 
Bin Laden’s December 2004 statements urged Muslims to oppose the creation
of democratic governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories; to
resist non-Islamic reform movements in other Islamic societies; and to overturn
existing regimes deemed insufficiently-Islamic by Al Qaeda such as the Saudi
monarchy.25  Like Zawahiri, Bin Laden based his call for revolutionary change in
CRS-8
25 (...continued)
should not be the sole source of legislation... Palestine is under occupation and its
constitution is man-made and pagan, and Islam has nothing to do with it.” FBIS Report -
FEA20041227000762, December 27, 2004.  
26  “If the ruler renounces the law of God, the governed, on God’s orders, must cease to obey
him...  Rights cannot be restored from a regime when the ruler becomes renegade or refuses
to follow religion except by force.” FBIS Report - GMP20041216000222, December 16,
2004.
Islamic societies on a stated belief in a model of governance where Muslims are
empowered to choose and depose their leaders according to Islamic principles.26  Bin
Laden also argued that, “all Muslims should embark on reforms,” but similarly
cautioned, that “reforms should be achieved in accordance with the religious laws.”
Al Qaeda’s Audiences.  Experts believe that Osama Bin Laden’s statements
contain calculated variations in tone and content that address or appeal to various
target audiences. In his early statements, Bin Laden adopted a pseudo-nationalist tone
in directly addressing the population of Saudi Arabia and outlining ways that specific
groups in Saudi society could support Al Qaeda.  In recent statements addressed to
the U.S. and European public, Bin Laden has downplayed threats of violence and
attempted to portray himself as a statesmanlike figure more palatable to Western
audiences and appealing to moderate Muslims. Bin Laden’s earlier statements also
addressed the American public in several instances that he since has characterized as
attempts to explain his motives and outline steps he and his followers believed the
United States should have taken in order to avoid Al Qaeda attacks.
 Over time, the cornerstone of Al Qaeda’s religious and political rhetoric has
remained consistent: Muslims should view themselves as a single nation and unite
to resist anti-Islamic aggression on the basis of obligatory defensive jihad.  Non-
Islamic government is unacceptable, and Muslims should join Al Qaeda and other
sympathetic groups and movements in opposing those seeking to establish secular
democratic governments or maintain existing governments deemed to be
insufficiently Islamic.  Bin Laden has often coupled his “Islamic-unity” rhetoric with
litanies of anti-Semitic statements, condemnations of Israel, and allegations of U.S.
complicity in the suffering of Muslims worldwide.  In many pre-9/11 statements, Bin
Laden broadened his rhetorical outreach to appeal to non-Arab Muslims, especially
those concerned with or engaged in conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the
Philippines.  Following September 11, 2001, Bin Laden has appealed directly to
national groups on the front lines of robust counter-terrorism operations, particularly
the populations of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories.  
Pragmatic Messianism.  Although Bin Laden’s ideological rhetoric has
remained relatively consistent, the Al Qaeda leader has placed varying levels of
emphasis on specific strategic objectives and tactics in his statements over the years.
Bin Laden has outlined specific political demands that support an image of Al Qaeda
as a pliable, pragmatic political actor.  Nevertheless, Al Qaeda’s operational record
seems to indicate that its leaders’ commitment to specific national causes and
strategic objectives are rhetorical tools designed to elicit support for their broader
ideological agenda of confrontation with the West and puritanical reform in the
CRS-9
27  In his September 1996 declaration of jihad against the United States, Bin Laden described
the presence of U.S. troops in the Arabian peninsula as “one of the worst catastrophes to
befall Muslims since the death of the Prophet [Mohammed].”  In an earlier interview,
however, Bin Laden had indicated that the “the withdrawal of American troops” would
serve as the “solution” to the crisis between the United States and the Islamic world.
28 “Interview Held with Usama Bin Ladin on 21 Oct. 2001,” Jihad Online News, Jan. 21,
2003.
29  Bin Laden sanctioned cooperation with Baathists “despite our belief in the infidelity of
socialists.” “Usama Bin Ladin’s Message to Iraq,” Al Jazirah Television, Feb. 11, 2003.
30  “The Iraqi who is waging Jihad against the infidel Americans or Allawi’s renegade
government is our brother and companion, even if he was of Persian, Kurdish, or Tukomen
origin. The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the Mujahidin, who
(continued...)
Islamic world.  For example, Bin Laden’s rhetorical treatment of the presence of U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s is largely inconsistent with Al Qaeda’s
ongoing terrorist operations there following the almost complete withdrawal of U.S.
military forces from Saudi Arabia in September 2003.27  Although fewer than 250
U.S. military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda affiliates have continued
a violent campaign to topple the Saudi government and have targeted non-U.S.
civilians in numerous terrorist attacks.
Similarly, variations in the intensity and prominence of Bin Laden’s anti-Israeli
rhetoric has fueled suggestions that Al Qaeda’s commitment to the Palestinian cause
waxes and wanes depending on the network’s need for support — becoming more
pronounced during periods when Al Qaeda’s actions have alienated supporters or
recently as part of a more outright ideological appeal.  Bin Laden has addressed these
charges personally and argued that support for the Palestinians and all Muslims is and
will remain essential to Al Qaeda’s cause, which is the mobilization of the entire
Muslim world in resistance to perceived U.S. aggression.28  Bin Laden and his
deputies have characterized military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as new
provocations and “crusades” that justify ongoing attacks.  In his December 2004
statements, Bin Laden referred to the confrontation between the U.S., its allies, and
jihadist movements as “a war of destiny between infidelity and Islam” and a “Third
World War,” seemingly leaving little doubt about the scope or flexibility of Al
Qaeda’s ambitions, grievances, and demands.
Tactically, Bin Laden consistently has advocated a program of retributional
violence against the United States for alleged crimes against Muslims while
demonstrating sophisticated perspectives on cooperation with non-Arab communities
and non-Islamist groups. In addressing the conflict in Iraq, for example, Bin Laden
has encouraged Islamist insurgents to work with “Socialist” groups (Baathists) and
compared cooperation between Islamists and Baathists to Arab and Persian
collaboration against the Byzantine empire in the 7th and 8th centuries.29  Bin Laden
has also encouraged Muslim Iraqis and non-Iraqis of all ethnic and linguistic
backgrounds to cooperate in opposing the Interim Iraqi Government and coalition
forces in Iraq.  He has applied similar disregard for ethnic, linguistic, and ideological
differences in issuing condemnations of so-called collaborators; identifying Arabs
cooperating with Iraqi and coalition authorities as equally guilty parties.30
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Bin Laden’s statements reveal sophisticated consideration of the economic and
military vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies, particularly with regard to
the role of Middle Eastern oil as “the basis of industry” in the global economy.31  Bin
Laden has called for Muslim societies to become more self-sufficient economically
and has urged Arab governments to preserve oil as “a great and important economic
power for the coming Islamic state.”  Bin Laden also has described economic
boycotts as “extremely effective”32 weapons.  Bin Laden’s recent descriptions of Al
Qaeda’s “bleed-until-bankruptcy plan” and his discussion of the U.S. economy and
the decreasing value of the U.S. dollar fit his established pattern of citing the
economic effects of terrorist attacks as proof of Al Qaeda’s success.  Recent
statements urging attacks on oil pipelines and military supply lines could indicate a
shift in Al Qaeda’s strategic and tactical planning in favor of a more protracted
attritional conflict characterized by disruptive attacks on economic and critical
infrastructure.  In this regard, Bin Laden has identified “martyrdom operations,” or
suicide attacks, as “the most important operations” for disrupting the activities of the
United States and its allies.33  
Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International.  Overall, Al Qaeda leaders have
displayed a pragmatic willingness to adapt the strategic and tactical content of their
statements to changing circumstances while retaining a messianic commitment to a
broader ideological agenda. Although Bin Laden’s self-professed goal is to “move,
incite, and mobilize the [Islamic] nation”34 until it reaches a revolutionary “ignition
point,”35 Bin Laden’s statements and Al Qaeda’s attacks largely have failed to
effectively mobilize widespread Muslim support for their agenda thus far.  Since late
2001, however, public opinion polling and media monitoring in the Middle East and
broader Islamic world indicate that significant dissatisfaction with the United States
and its foreign policy has grown significantly within many Muslim societies.  In light
of this trend, Bin Laden’s recent shift toward more explicitly political and ideological
rhetoric and his emphasis on the economic effectiveness of Al Qaeda’s campaign to
date seem to be harbingers of a renewed attempt by Al Qaeda’s central leadership to
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broaden the movement’s appeal, solicit greater material support,36 and possibly
inspire new and more systematically devastating attacks.  Some experts have argued
however, that the increasingly uncompromising, anti-democratic tone of recent
statements by Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and Al Zarqawi may alienate Muslims who
oppose theocracy and who support secular, representative government.
Experience suggests that Al Qaeda’s leaders believe that regular attempts to
characterize Al Qaeda’s actions as defensive and religiously sanctioned will increase
tolerance of and support for their broader ideological program.  The identification of
limited political objectives and the implication that their fulfilment will resolve
broader grievances also may help to mask the group’s underlying ideological agenda.
Overall, Bin Laden’s statements from the mid-1990s through the present indicate that
he continues to see himself and his followers as the vanguard of an international
Islamic movement primarily committed to ending U.S. “interference” in the affairs
of Islamic countries and supportive of efforts to overturn and recast Islamic societies
according to narrow Salafist interpretations of Islam and Islamic law.  His public
statements, and those of his deputies, will likely continue to play an important,
calculated role in reaching these goals.
